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ABSTRACT 
A basic problem faced by most economies at early stages of their 
development is how best to raise the investible surplus for rapid 
accumulation: to what extend should the burden be placed on those in the 
agricultural sector (by lowering the price of their output relative to the 
industrial products), and to what extent should the burden be borne by 
industrial workers. This question was central to the early Soviet state 
(where it was debated as the problem of price 1ci11or1) and it is central 
to many of today's lDCs, whether socialist or not. The answer de.pends in 
an important way on· the salient features of the economy: among the 
features of the economy which we emphasize here are: the trade environ­
ment faced by the economy, the mechanisms which determine wages and 
earnings, and the effects of wages and prices on the productivity of 
workers. Under alternative representations of these features, we analyze 
the consequences of changing the terms of trade (on peasants, on 
industrial workers, and on the investible surplus) and identify several 
intuitive properties of the optimal terms of trade. 
We examine two other issues which have remained controversial. The 
first issue concerns the effect of changes in the terms of trade on the 
intrasectoral distribution within agriculture (for example, on the welfare 
of landless workers versus that of landlords). We delineate simple condi­
tions to determine who gains and who loses. The second issue concerns 
which agricultural inputs and outputs should be taxed, and which should be 
subsidized, We present powerful rules for reform in the prices of cash 
crops and production inputs. These rules are Pareto improving (that is, 
everyone in the society becomes better off); moreover., they are highly 
parsimonious with respect to the information required to implement them, 
We also use the insights obtained in our analysis to interpret certain 
aspects of the Soviet industrialization debate (1924-28), and the 
subsequent collectivization of agriculture. 
l 
PRICE SCISSORS AND TIIE STRUCTIJRE OF THE ECONOMY 
By Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz• 
A basic problem faced by the early Soviet state was how best to raise 
the revenues required if rapid capital accU111Ulation was to be achieved. 
To what extent should the burden be placed on the peasants, by lowering 
the price they rec~ive for their output (relative to the price of indus­
trial goods), and to what extent should the burden be placed on the 
industrial proletariat? This question of the appropriate terms of trade 
between the urban and rural sectors (the 'price scissors') was central in 
the Soviet industrialization debate (1924-28). In recent years, the same 
question has been intensely debated in the People's Republic of China, 
with a widespread view that (to use the economists' language) the rural 
sector was too heavily tued during the Cultural Revolution, and that both 
sectors could be made better off by reducing the size of the scissors. 
In an earlier paper (1984a), we constructed a model which, we believe, 
captured well the central issues concerning the price scissors in a less 
developed socialist economy. We posited a closed dual economy in which 
the government has two instruments of control: the terms of trade and the 
industrial wage. 
1 Within this model, we identified the role of 
incentives, the effect of the terms of trade on how industrial wages must 
be set, and the effect of different value judgments (concerning the 
welfare of peasants versus proletariat) on the appropriate size of price 
scissors. Also, our model allowed us to interpret the scissors policy 
advocated by some of the key participants in the Soviet debate. 
1 
2 
The question of the appropriate price scissors is, of course, central 
to most less developed countries, whether socialist or not; simply 
because this question represents a fundamental trade off in the process of 
development. The nature of the trade off (that is, the effects of 
changing the terms of trade, and the characteristics of the optimal terms 
of trade), however, depend critically on the structure of th~ economy; in 
particular, on the hypotheses concerning the institutional features of the 
econooy. Among the features of the economy on which we focus in this 
~ 
paper are the international trade environment faced by the country, the 
nature of mechanisms which (endogenously) determine wages and earnings 
(and the government's role in it), and the consequences of changes in 
prices and wages on the productivity of workers. 
Whether LDCs should be viewed as open or closed economies has been 
long debated. What is critical, however, is not the level of trade (say 
relative to the national income) but the ability of the government to 
change the level of trade at the margin. If the government can not do so 
(for instance, because the demand for .the country's exports is very 
inelastic in the short run, or because the country faces constraints in 
the international credit market which limit its ability to trade) then the 
analysis of the price scissors in these economies is quite similar to that 
in a closed economy. In particular, we had argued in our earlier analysis 
that, in a closed economy, a change in the terms of trade must be 
accompanied by a change in the industrial wage. If the industrial wage 
cannot be altered, then the government has no ability to change the terms 
of trade. Similar conclusions hold if the economy is closed at the 
margin. By contrast. if the economy is open at the margin, then the terms 
of trade can be set independently of the industrial wage. This, as we 
3 
shall see, has important implications on the consequences of alternative 
terms of trade policies, 
Concerning the determination of industrial wage, we consider two 
alternative contexts. In a 'socialist' economy, the government presum­
ably has the prerogative of setting industrial wage. In contrast, most 
I.DC, have mixed economies in which private firms and unions play a major 
role in wage determination and, moreover, the level of wage is sensitive 
to the prices which the industrial workforce faces. Therefore, in 
•-
determining the effects of changes in the te.rms of trade, one needs to 
take into account the indirect effects (on individuals' welfare as well as 
on the investible surplus) of induced changes in industrial wage. 
Several hypotheses have been advanced in the literature which contend 
that the wages received by workers may affect their net productivity.
2 
The corresponding effects of prices on productivity have not received the 
same attention. Here we develop a simple way of representing both of 
these productivity effects (for brevity, we refer to both effects as 
'wage-productivity' effects). We incorporate these effects into our 
analysis, and show how specific types of wage-productivity effects (for 
example, when food consumption affects productivity 'more' than the 
consumption of other goods) influence the analysis of the terms of trade. 
The first objective of this paper is thus to determine the incidence 
of the terms of trade under these various assumptions concerning the 
structure of the economy, to analyze the optimal terms of trade, and to 
relate them both to the structure of the economy and to society's value 
judgments, We do this in Sections I to III. 
Another objective of this paper is to address two issues of vital 
interest to LDCs today, The first issue concerns the intrasectoral 
4 
distributional consequences of the terms of trade: which groups in the 
agricultural sector (landless workers, or landlords, for example) are 
helped or hurt by a movement of the terms of trade against, or in favor, 
of agriculture. This question has been a source of controversy in many 
LDCs. 3 In Section IV, we delineate conditions which determine who will 
gain and who will lose, due to a change in the terms· of trade. Also, we 
demonstrate that under plausible circumstances, a movement in the terms of 
trade against (in favor of) agriculture hurts (helps) everyone in this 
sector, whether rich _or poor. Further, we show that our basic 
characterization of the optimal terms of trade can be modified in a simple 
way to include the distributional consequences. 
The second issue concerns which of the agricultural inputs and outputs 
should be taxed or subsidized. The answer, as one would espect, depends 
in part on the social weights to be associated with the incomes of 
different persons (that is, on the value judgments implicit in the social 
welfare function), because changes in the prices of different goods have 
different distributional consequences. 
Agreements on social weights are, however~ difficult to achieve among 
policy makers and government officials. In Section V, therefore, we have 
derived Pareto improving rules for reform in the prices of cash crops 
(sugar cane and cotton, for example) and agricultural inputs (fertilizer 
and tractors, for example). These reforms make the society better off 
without hurting anyone; moreover, the reforms can be conducted on the 
basis of extremely limited information. Our analysis of the structure of 
prices within the agricultural sector also leads us to argue that there is 
a case against taxing some cash crops and agricultural inputs, while 
subsidizing others. 
s 
The last two sections are devoted to additional interpretations and 
extensions. In Section VI, we use parts of our analysis to interpret many 
of the propositions (concerning price scissors) advanced by the Soviet 
economist Evgeny Preobrazhensky (1965) in the context of the 
pre-collectivization USSR. We also look at certain aspects of the Soviet 
collectivization of agriculture. In Section VII, we show how our analysis 
in this paper can be extended to include several other features of the 
economy (such as sharecropping, migration and unemployment) as well as 
other instruments of policy. Concluding remarks are presented at the end 
of the paper. 
I. PRICE SCISSORS IN AN OPEN ECONOMY 
In this section, we describe the basic model of the economy, analyze 
the effects of changes in the terms of trade, and characterize the optimal 
terms of trade. The model is that of an open dual economy in which the 
urban wage may either be rigid, or be set optimally by the government. 
(In Section II, we drop the assumption that the economy is open; and in 
Section III, endogenous determination of urban wages is considered.) 
1
The Model: The rural and urban populations are denoted by N and 
4 A is the total agricultural land owned equally by homogeneous 
peasants. The output of the agricultural good per peasant is 
1 1X = X(A/;, L ) , and L is the variable number of hours a peasant 
1 1works. (x, y) denote a peasant's consumption of the agricultural and 
1industrial goods, Q = X - x > 0 , is the surplus of the agricultural 
good per peasant. p represents the terms of trade, that is, the price of 
the agricultural good in terms of the industrial good, A peasa~t•s budget 
constraint is 
6 
( 1) pO = y 1 
1If a peasant's indirect utility is denoted by V (p) then, from Roy's 
1 1identity, ov /op= i.. Q where i..i is the (positive) marginal utility 
1of income of a person in sector i. 'Qp • a1n Q/aln p is the elas-
ticity of surplus per peasant with respect to its price. We assume that 
this elasticity is positive. 5 
2 2
An industrial worker's consumption is denoted by (x, y) , and his 
L2 6 wage rate and (fixed) labor hours are w and A worker's budget 
constraint is 
2(2) wL • 
2
If V (p, w) denotes the indirect utility of an urban worker, then 
2 2 2 2 2i..2L2av /ap = -i., X and av /ow = m = wL denotes a worker's 
2 2 2 2incom.e and f; = -oln X /oln p and f; = a1n x /oln m denote,xp xm 
respectively, the elasticities of his consumption of the agricultural good 
with respect to price and income. These elasticities are positive since 
consumption goods are assumed to be normal. 
The output of an industrial workers is denoted by Y • It depends on 
2the capital stock per worker, k, and the labor hours per worker, L • 
In addition, we take account of wage-productivity effects. These effects 
have been typically studied in the context of fixed prices, and it has 
been hypothesized that productivity is increasing in wage income because, 
for exa1:1ple, higher consumption increases workers' efficiency. A natural 
generalization suggests that price changes also affect workers' productiv­
ity. The wage-productivity effects are thus represented through the last 
two arguments of the following reduced form expression 
7 
2
(3) Y = Y(k, L , p, w). 
aY _l 
For later use, we define a and a = - to repre-m p ap 2 • 
X 
sent productivity gains from an increase in wage income and from a 
reduction in the terms of trade, respectively. 
Since the effects of prices on productivity are not predictable, in 
general, 7 we consider here two representative specifications: 
(i) Productivity depends on, and increases with, the level of utility; 
2 , 
Y = Y(v (p, w)) In this case, a = a (ii) Productivitythat is, m P 
depends on, and increases with, the consumption of food (agricultural 
2u 
£ 
2 _aY ~ 
good); that is, Y = Y(x (p, w)) • In this case, a m - a p = c!x2 p 
2u . 2u
where £ = -clln x /clln p denotes the own-price elasticity of the xp 
compensated food consumption of an industrial worker. From Slutsky 
2u 2 2 8 Thus, a < a The latter speci-properties, £ = t - a t > 0 
xp xp x xm m p 
fication can be seen as a polar case of the view that productivity is 
'more' sensitive to food consumption than to the consumption of other 




If T and T denote the net imports of the two goods, then trade 
X y 
T = -PT where P is the (fixed) international termsbalance implies y X 
of trade. The investible surplus, defined in terms of the industrial 
1 1 
good, is: I = N
.2
Y - ~y PT Substitution of (1) and (2) in 
X 
the preceeding expression yields 
The quantity balance of the agricultural good is represented by 
8 
There are no constraints on external trade in the present ■odel. There­
fore. (5) can be substituted into (4) to yield 
That is, the investible surplus equals the profit from industrial 
production. plus th• tariff revenue from external trade. Note here that. 
in (6). p and w can be altered independently of one another. This 
independence. as we shall see later, plays a critical role in determining 
the consequences of changes in the terms of trade in an open economy. 
Effects of Policy Changes: The effects of changing p on individuals 
are obvious: lowering the terms of trade hurts peasants and helps 
industrial workers. The effects on investment can be ascertained from 
(6). The derivative of (6) with respect to p can be rearranaed to yield 
where 8 = T tt-fx2 is the net import of the agricultural aood as a 
X 
fraction of its consumption in the industrial sector. A negative (posi-
tive) 8 implies that the country exports (imports) the agricultural good. 
Also. 1 > 8. from (5) an~ from Q > 0. • c (p - P)/P represents 
the tax or subsidy rate on the agricultural good. A negative (positive) 
s implies that the peasants are being taxed (subsidized) whereas the 
industrial workers are being subsidized (taxed). 
There are three distinct implications of raising the terms of trade. 
9 
First, raising p increases or decreases the tariff revenue depending on 
whether, at present, the country is an importer or an esporter of the 
aaricultural good. Second, a hiaher p implies a laraer nral surplus 
and a aaaller urban demand ud, hence, a lower net iaport of the 
agricultural aood. As a result, the tariff rn·enue increases or decreases 
depending on whether, at present, the aaricultural aood ia being tased or 
subsidized. Finally, a higher p reduces the in·natible 1urplu1 because 
of its deleterious effect on productivity. These distinct effect, can be 
•-
seen separately in the right hand side of (7). 
The overall impact of the terms of trade on the investible surplus, of 
course, depends on the combination of the above effects. It appears 
unlikely, however, that lowering the terms of trade below ao■e critical 
level would increase the investible surplus. This is because the country 
would be importing food (that is e > 0) at a sufficiently low p, 
and I would be a large negative number. Thus, if the marainal gain in 
industrial productivity from lowering p is negliaible when p is 
sufficiently low, then (7) will be positive. 
Next, consider the effects of changina the urban waae. A higher w 
helps industrial workers, and it bas no effect on peasants. Its effect on 
the investible surplus is given by the derivative of (6) with respect to 
w. This derivative can be rearranaed as 
2 2where a ~ px /m is an industrial worker's budget share on the agricul­
x 
tural good. Clearly, 1 > a 2 > 0. Once again, the right hand side of 
X 
(8) is easily interpreted. A higher urban wage reduces I dire~tly 
10 
because the profit from industrial production is reduced. A higher urban 
wage increases the urban consumption of the agricultural good which, in 
turn, increases or decreases the tariff revenue depending on whether the 
urban workers are (at present) paying a tax or receiving a •ubsidy on this 
100d. Finally, a higher urban wage increases the investible surplus due 
to its positive effect on productivity. 
The importance of wage-productivity effects can be seen as follows. 
Suppose e
2 < 1 at a given p and w, and that waa,-productivityxm -
effects are insignificant. Then, the expression (8) predicts that a 
further lowering of the urban wage increases the investible surplus, 
regardless of the current terms of trade. This is because, by definition, 
2 
s < 1 and a < 1 and, hence, the right hand side of (8) is negative if 
X 
cs is negligible. This conclusion would, however, be reversed if wage-
m 
productivity effects are significant, particularly at low levels of urban 
wage where the productivity loss due to a further wage reduction may be 
suff~ci~ntly large to offset other gains in the investible surplus. 
Optimal Terms of Trade: The current value of the discounted aggregate 
social welfare is represented by the Hamiltonian 
(9) H = ti + oI 
where I is given by (6), 6 denotes the (positive) social value of the 
1
marginal investible surplus, and ti= N
1wcv ) + frw(v2) is an additive 
9 .-2 2 1 2 
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. aetap c W-x ((1 - e)~ - ~] , 
and aetaw = frL2~2 , where ~i c Aiaw,avi denotes the social weight OD 
on the marginal income of an individual in sector i • We take the 
derivative of (9) with respect to p, · keeping w fixed, and use (7). A 
rearrangement of this derivative yields the following characterization of 
11 
the (internal) optimal terms of trade 
1 2 1 
(~ - ~ ) + 8(6 - ~ ) - 6a 
(10) s I: 
6[(1 - 8)£Qpl + &2 ] 
xp 
The internal optimum of (9) with respect to w, keeping p fixed, is 
characterized by 
2 2
(11) 1 - a ... Sa & 
m x xm 
When p and w are both being set optimally, then the substitution 
of (11) into (10) allows it to be rewritten as 
0)(1 ~ + - ___-(1 - -
1
/6) (am__ a)s = ____________ 
(12) 
(1 _ 0 )£1 + &2u 
Qp xp 
Now recall that 1 > 0, and a < a From (12), therefore, s is 
m - p 
negative if On the other hand s is poi it ive if 1 < I>
1
/6 , 
and a's are negligible. Further, consider the special case in which the 
society maximizes the investible surplus, that is pi/6 -> 0. In this 
case, s is negative from (12) and, hence, a > 1 from (11). The m 
following results are i1:1I11ediate; these results are entirely independent 
of the volume or the direction of trade. 
(i) Peasants are taxed if the social weight on their income is smaller 
than that on the investible surplus. 
(ii) Peasants are subsidized if the social weight on their income is 
larger than that on the investible surplus, and if wage-productivity 
. . .f. 10 e ff ects are not s1gn1 1cant, 
(iii) In an econo □y concerned solely with maximizing the investible 
12 
surplus, peasants are taxed, and the wage and prices faced by industrial 
workers are such that an increase in their wage would increase their 
output more than proportionately. 
The last result appears counterintuitive at first sight, because one 
would expect that the society should be willing to increase the industrial 
wage if it can recover, through increased productivity, more than what it 
paid. The reason why this is not true is that an increased industrial 
wage also increases the food consumption of industrial workers. This, in 
turn, leads to a loss in the public revenue because the (optimal) domestic 
food price is lower than the international food price. This indirect 
revenue effect makes it undesirable for the society to take full advantage 
of the productivity gains from increasing the industrial wage. 
The expression (12) provides additional insights which are important 
but somewhat partial. For instance, recall that (cs - cs ) is zero when 
Ill p 
productivity depends on workers' utility, and it is negative when produc-
tivity depends on food consumption. Expression (12) thus suggests that 
the optimal terms of trade are lower if productivity is 'more' sensitive 
11 
to workers' food consumption than to their consumption of other goods. 
This is what one would expect, since the marginal social gain from 
lowering the food price is higher if workers' productivity is more 
sensitive to food consumption. 
The expression (12) also suggests that the magnitude of the optimal 
tax or subsidy rate is smaller if the peasants' surplus elasticity is 
higher. This is intuitive since a higher implies that there is a 
larger change in the net import of the agricultural good (and hence in the 
tariff revenue) due to a given change in the terms of trade. 
13 
II. CONSTRAINTS ON TRADE 
Many U>Cs face imperfect trade environments, auch as q
uantity 
constraints imposed by their importing partners and bo
rrowing constraints 
Also, many developing countriesin the international credit market. 
consider it essential to maintain a certain degree of 
self-sufficiency in 
These and other similar circumstances can often bespecific goods. 
If such a constraint isformulated as constraints on pricing policies. 
binding, then its ~rimary implication within the conte
xt of the above 
can no longer be changed independently of onemodel is that p and w 




are fixed at the margin, that is, TX 
and Ty 
are fixed. 
tion of other types of constraints can be similarly st
udied. A change in 
terms of trade must now be accompanied by a change in 
the urban wage, to 
maintain the quantity balance, (5), in the market for 
the agricultural 
good. If ewp 
= dln w/dln p represents this change in wage, in an 
elasticity form, then a perturbation in (5) shows that 
1




xm > O.wp 
Thus: In an economy with constraints on traded quant
ities, a decrease in 
the term of trade must be accompanied by a decrease in
 the urban wage. 
The reason is simple. Lowering the terms of trade lea
ds to a smaller 
supply of rural surplus and a larger urban food demand
. To balance the 
Further, as
demand and supply, therefore, the urban wage must be r
educed. 
we would expect, (13) shows that: The reduction in th
e urban wage, 
corresponding to a decrease in the terms of trade, is 
larger if the 
peasants' surplus elasticity is larger, or if the net imp
ort of the 
14 
agricultural good is smaller in relation to its urban consumption. 
The industrial workers thus face a lower price, but also a lower wage, 
when the terms of trade are lowered. The overall effect.on their welfare 
2 2 2
dv • av + av dwis This can be expressed asdp ap aw dp • 
2 2 2(14) dv /dp-=). x p 
1 2uwhere p = -1 + £ ,a2 . Using (13), p - cu - e>aQp + azp11a 2 t 2 ) 0 wp•- X x xm 
and hence, (14) is positive. Thus: In an economy with constraints on the 
traded guantities 1 a decrease in the terms of trade hurts peasants as well 
as industrial workers. 
The impact of the terms of trade on the investible surplus is quite 
easy to analyze in the present case. Lowering the terms of trade implies 
lowering the urban wage which, in turn, increases investment. The effect 
on productivity, however, is ambiguous since a lower food price increases 
productivity whereas a lower urban wage decreases productivity. The total 
effect can be obtained from where (13) gives the 
change in wage and, from (4), investment is given by: 
I= ~(Y - wL2) + (p - P)T • This yields
X 
2(15) dl/dp = -~x [(1 - 8) - (a - a)+ (1 - a )p]m p m 
A sufficient condition for the above to be negative is a < 1 • But,m 
clearly, (15) will be negative so long as a is not too large comparedm 
to one. Hence: In an economy with constraints on traded guantities 1 a 
decrease in the terms of trade increases investment, provided wage­
productivity effects are not too significant. 12 
The Hamiltonian in the present case is 
15 
is the
H = e +&I+ 11 CN1o + T - N2x2] , where I is given by (4), 11/0 
X 
shadow price of the agricultural good in terms of the 
industrial good, and 
the last part of H represents the constraint (S).
13 If 
that is, the tax or subsidy is now defined with resp
ect
S c: (p ft/6)/p, 
to the shadow price, then it is easily verified that 
the optimal terms of 
trade continue to be characterized by (10), (11), and 
(12), and the 
Finally,
corresponding interpretations hold in the present case
 as well. 
it should be obvious that a special case of the presen
t model is a closed 
economy. The corresponding results can be obtained si
mply by substituting 
8 = 0 ipto the expressions (10) to (1S).
14 
III. ENDOGENOUS INDUSTRIAL WAGE 
In this section, we examine the consequences of chang
ing the terms of 
trade in an economy in which the urban wage is determ
ined endogenously, 
rather than being set by the government. In most suc
h situations, the 
wages industrial workers receive are sensitive to the
 prices which they 
face and, therefore, a change in the terms of trade h
as an induced effect 
This induced effect, in turn, affects the investibleon the urban wages. 
surplus as well as the welfare of workers. We begin w
ith a general formu­
lation which is consistent with several alternative h
ypotheses concerning 
how the urban wage is determined; moreover, this form
ulation has the 
advantage of identifying the central implications of 
the endogeneity of 
We also present some special cases of this formulatio
n.
the urban wage. 
Our analysis in this section assumes that there are n
o constraints on 
15 The urban wage rate is represented in reduced form asexternal trade. 
16 
(16) w = w(p) 
Denote t = dln w/dln p as the elasticity corresponding to (16) and, 
wp 
for brevity, define p = -1 + £ ,a.2 Based on (6) and (16), therefore, 
wp X 
the effects of the terms of trade on peasants, industrial workers and the 
government can be easily ascertained, following our earlier analysis. 
To analyze the normative aspects, note that the Hamiltonian is now 
H = t + 61 + µ~L2 [w - w(p)] , where the last term accounts for the 
constraint (16), µ is a Hamiltonian multiplier, and I is given by (6). 
Expressions corresponding to (10), (11), and (12) can be easily obtained. 
For instance, the expression (12) now has an additional term -µp/6 in 
its numerator. We consider the following special cases of urban wage 
determination. 
( i) Fixed Welfare of Urban Worker: If the urban wage is determined 
through a bargaining between the government and a trade union, and if the 
union does not suffer from money illusion, that is, the union understands 
how the welfare of its members is affected by changes in the wage and 
prices, then the urban wage is defined by 
2 -2(17) V (p, W) = V 
-2where V is an industrial worker's utility, determined as the outcome of 
bargaining. Expression (17) is a special case of (16). By perturbing 
2(17) we obtain t = a and, hence, p = 0. Thus, once again, (12) 
wp X 
holds at the optimum, and the corresponding price and industrial wage are 
determined from (12) and {17). (In contrast, the expressions (11) and 
(12) characterize the optimum when the government can set the industrial 
17 
wage.) 
Bow high or low the resulting terms of trade would be depends, of 
course, on how much the society cares about peasants. An instructive 
special case (which also turns out to be useful in our later 
interpretation of the Soviet debate) is one in which the society does not 
care about peasants. Denote the corresponding optimal terms of trade by 
· 16p•. Then, substituting we can reexpress (12) as 
1 2u
(1 - e>aQp + ep• = p _____________x.._p______ 
(18) < p • 
(1 - 8)(1 + eQp - a)
1 ) + e2u - (axp m p 
Thus, p• represents the optimal terms of trade when the welfare of 
industrial workers is maintained at any given level, and the welfare of 
peasants does not matter. It must therefore be the case that p• 
maximizes investment, subject to a given level of welfare of industrial 
workers. This is easily verified by noting that dl/dp ~ 0 if 
! • 17 Thus: For any given level of welfare of industrial workers,p } p • 
a decrease (increase) in the terms of trade increases the investible 
surplus when the existing terms of trade is above (below) a critical 
level, p•, which is below the international relative price. 
The above result has an important implication even in those cases in 
which the government can set the industrial wage at whatever level it 
wishes, and when the welfare of peasants matters. Note that, for any 
level of welfare of industrial workers, a price below p• not only 
reduces the investible surplus but it also hurts peasants. Therefore: 
Anv price below p• is Pareto inefficient. 
(ii) Fixed Urban Wage: If the urban wage is fixed in terms of the 
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industrial good, then the optimal terms of trade is characterized by (10). 
If the urban wage is fixed in terms of food then, obviously, e e 1 • 
wp 
Dixit and Stern (1974) considered a further special case of the latter, in 
which the hours of work for a peasant are fixed ud equal that for an 
industrial worker, the urban wage equals the (fixed) food output of a 
peasant, there are no wage-productivity effects, and the society maximizes 
investment. That is, X and y are fixed, wL2 • pX, X 1 • X2 Sub-
stitution of these into (6) yields: I• ~(Y - PX) - (p - P)(N1 + ~)Q. 
These assumption$, in effect, reduce a two-sector economy to a single­
sector economy consisting of homogeneous individuals. The derivative of 
I with respect to p yields the corresponding result 
1(19) s = -1/e 
~ 
IV. DlSTRIBlITION WITHIN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Our earlier representation that the agricultural sector consists of 
homogeneous peasants is, of course, a simplifying assumption which, though 
allowing us to focus on the intersectoral aspects, obscures the intra­
sectoral consequences of changes in the terms of trade. These 
consequences have often been a source of controversy, and they depend not 
only on the income and land distribution within agriculture, but also on 
the induced effects of prices on variables such as the rural wage, migra­
tion, reallocation of land entailed by migration, the terms of share­
cropping and credit, and the arrangements for sharing work and output 
within families. For brevity, we focus here on the induced effect on the 
rural wage but, as we point out later, other induced effects can be 
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analyzed similarly. 
The importance of the induced effects can be seen as follows. If 
there were no induced effects, then an increase in food price would hurt 
the net buyers of food (the landless and the farmers with small land 
holdings), and help the net sellers of food (large landlords, for 
example). Quite the reverse may be the case, as we shall see below, if 
the wage is highly responsive to the food price. 
A person belonging to the rural group h is denoted by the super-
Ah Qhscript h • Correspondingly', is the 1 and he owns. is his 
surplus of agricultural good, which can be positive, negative or zero. 
L1h is his net labor supply hours (that is, labor hours he supplies minus 
the labor hours employed on his farm). Thus L1h is positive (negative) 
for the net suppliers (demanders) of labor. Clearly, A
h 
c: 0 , 
and Qh < 0, for the landless. An individual's budget constraint is 
where w 1 (p) represents the rural wage per hour which, in general, would 
depend on the terms of trade. Let e 
1 
c: dln w 1/dln p denote the elas­
wp 
ticity of the rural wage rate with respect to p. Then, using (20), the 
Roy's identity yields: 
This can be rearranged as 
The above expression, in combination with (20), yields the following 
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results. 
A decrease in the terms of trade hurts (i) every rural individual, 
rich or poor. if the elasticity of the rural wage rate with respect to 
price is close to one, (ii) the net sellers (demanders) of labor if the 
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elasticity is significantly greater (smaller) than one. 
Clearly, how large or small the elasticity of the rural wage rate is 
depends on the nature of labor market and on the labor demand and supply 
responses of individuals. Here we consider the case in which there are.. 
constant returris to scale in agricultural pioduction, and the rural wage 
rate is determined in a competitive rural labor market, that is, from 
(23) 2Nlh(Lsh - A~d) = 0 
h 
where rfh is the number of individuals in the rural group h 
Lsh(p, wl) is the labor supply of an individual in group h and 
Ld(p, wl) is the labor employed on unit land. Thus, Llh = Lsh - AhLd 
is the net labor supply. 
d d d dDenote tLw = -iHn L /oln w and tLp = oln L /aln p as elastic-
ities of labor demand on unit land with respect to wage and price. Now, 
if the wage rate equals the marginal product; that is, if 
1 d d dw = paX(L )/aL, then £Lw = £Lp. This is what we would expect since, 
in the present case, the labor demand depends only on the ratio of the 
sh sh
wage and output price. Next, define £Lw = a1n L /oln w and 
sh sh
eLp = -oln L /aln p as elasticities of the labor supply, by an 
individual belonging to group h, with respect to wage and price. A 
perturbation in (23) then yields 
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(24) = 2J~sh(t~: - e~!)/(2 Nl~sh,~!e~ - 1 
h h 
anSubstitution of the above into (22) makes it possible to express 
individual's gain or loss from a change in the terms of trade solely in 
terms of the behavioral parameters which, in principle, can be estimated. 
Next, note that the right hand side of (24) is zero if either L
1 h is 
fixed, or if It is easily verified that the latter happens 
if the individuals' labor supply depends on the food price and on the 
wage, but not on the price of the industrial good. In both cases, it is 
obvious that the net labor supply of an individual (and hence of the 
entire sector) depends only on the ratio of the wage and the output price. 
From (22) and (24), therefore: AIi. increase (decrease) in the terms of 
trade helps (hurts) every rural individual if the rural wage rate equals 
the marginal product and if one of the following two conditions are met 
(i) individuals' labor supplies are fixed, or (ii) the elasticities of an 
individual's labor supply with respect to wage and price are close to one 
19another. 
The normative analysis in the context of heterogeneous agricultural 
individuals requires only a slight reinterpretation of our earlier 
derivations. Using (21), define the following 'average' social weight for 
the agricultural sector: ~l c 2Jh~lh(Qh + w 1L1ha!i,/p)/JQ, where 
h 
l . l 20Q = L NlhQh/Nl . average us individual.\ 1sthe surp per agr1cultura It 
h 
is easy to verify then that, with this reinterpretation, expressions (10), 
(11), and (12) continue to represent the optimum. 
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V. PARETO IMPROVING PRICE REFORMS FOR CASH CROPS 
AND AGRICULTURAL INPlITS 
The simplifying assumption that a single good is produced in each of 
the two sectors underlies the long-standina que1tion1 concerning the terms 
of trade between agriculture and industry, on which we have focu11ed 
above. Our analysis, however, can be easily generalized to a multitude of 
goods by interpreting Q, x, p and P as vectors. The effect of a 
change in the price of the i-th good on a rural individual belonging to 
group h is given by Roy's identity 
where Q~ is this individual's surplus of good i • This, as is obvious, 
1 
is a straightforward generalization of (21). The effects on the welfare 
of industrial workers and on the investible surplus can be assessed 
accordingly, and the corresponding optimal prices can be characterized 
following our earlier approach, The implementation of such an optimum, 
however, requires knowing, among other things, the distribution of income 
within each sector, the social weights corresponding to different groups 
of individuals, the own- and cross-elasticities of the consumption 
quantities with respect to prices, and the elasticities of the urban and 
rural wages with respect to various prices. Rather than focussing on the 
characteri- zation of this optimum, we present here a novel result which 
appears much more useful, which shows how Pareto improving price reforms 
can be conducted for certain goods on the basis of very limited 
information. 
Consider those agricultural inputs and outputs which are not consumed, 
such as fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery, and various cash 
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crops. For brevity, we refer to these goods as 'production goods,' 
Clearly, a change in the prices of these goods does not affect urban 
individuals, and it affects the consumption and the labor supply of rural 
individuals only through their full income and through the induced changes 
in the rural wage. Further, if the j-th aood is a production good, and 
Qh • Ahz is the vector of inputs and outputs on unit land, then j zj, 
where inputs (outputs) are represented as negative (positive) quantities. 
We consider here the case in which the rural wage is determined in a 
competitive labor market, and assume that all production goods have the 
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same (but not constant) elasticity with respect to wage. That is 
(26) h./h1 • glzj . 
This assumption, as we shall see, is entirely unnecessary if the induced 
wage effects are not significant. Using (26), we show in Appendix I that 
(27) dw1/dp. -= gz. . 
J J 
That is, the change in the rural wage due to a change in the price of a 
production good is proportional to the quantity of this production good on 
unit land. This result holds regardless of the nature of individuals' 
labor supply responses. 
Next, define 
(28) cj = -L sieji 
i 
where si = (pi - Pi)/pi represents the rates of taxes or subsidies, 
e .. = oln z./oln p. represents price elasticities of inputs and outputs
J 1 J 1 
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per unit of land, Thus, (28) represents the proportional change (due to 
taxation) in the quantity of the production good j • Using (6), (27), 
and (28), we show in Appendix I that 
(The variables g and B are defined in Appendix I, but they are 
irrelevant for the results to be derived below.) A special case of the 
above is, of course~ when the induced effects of price changes on the 
rural wage are insignificant. In this case g • 0 in (27) and, 
obviously, the assumption (26) is not needed. E.zpression (29) provides a 
basis for the following price reforms. 
Consider two production goods, j and t. If their prices are 
changed by Apj and -(zj/zt)Apj , respectively, then it follows from 
(25) and (27) that the welfare of every rural individual remains un­
changed. The resulting change in investment is obtained from (29) as 
(30) AI c (c. - c~)Az.Ap .• 
J .. J J 
The rules for price reforms follow immediately. Calculate c.'s for all 
J 
of the production goods. If and j and t are both outputs 
(inputs), then increase (decrease) the price of the j-th aood by a small 
amount, say Ap. , and decrease (increase) the price of the k-th good
J 
by (zj/zk)Apj • Parallel rules apply if the J-th good is an output 
(input) and the k-th good is an input (output). 
The above reforms lead to an unambiguous increase in the inveatible 
surplus, without affecting the welfare of any individual. Therefore; The 
rules of reform are Pareto improving, A remarkable property of these 
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rules is their extreme parsimony with respect
 to information. The 
required information to use these rules of re
form consists solely of the 
current taxes on inputs and outputs, current 
quantities of inputs and 
outputs on unit land, and the response of the
se quantities to the changes 
in the prices of production goods. 
Moreover, as should be obvious, our rules of 
reform take into account 
the induced effects of price changes on the r
ural wages, albeit under the 
If this
assumption (26) which restricts the nature of
 these effects. 
assumption appears too restrictive, then the 
relevant empirical question 
is: how different are the observed induced w
age effects from those with 
If the differences are not significant, then 
our
the above restriction? 
rules of reform can be employed with extreme 
parsimony in information. 
Finally, it is obvious from (30) that a nece
ssary condition for the 
should be equal for all productionoptimality of prices is that C,J 
1 S 
goods. That is, the proportional reduction 
in the quantities of different 
This bas an interest­
production goods, due to taxation, should be 
equal. 
ing implication. Assume, for a moment, that 
changes in the prices of 
production goods have negligible cross price 
effects on the quantities of 
inputs and outputs (that is, eJl
.• = 0 if i I j ). Then, from (28), 
Next, from the standard properties ofsje .. is the same for all j •
JJ 
for an output and e .. < 0 for an input.profit functions, eJJ.. > 
0 JJ 
Also, from our definition of s.J 
, positive (negative) implies a tax 
It follows then
(subsidy) on an input and a subsidy (tax) on 
an output. 
that either all of the production goods (inpu
ts as well as outputs) should 
be taxed or they should all be subsidized, bu
t not both. 
This last result is important not because we 
believe that the cross 
price effects are negligible. They are impo
rtant because they cast some 
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doubts on an oft given advice that, on the grounds of equity, some 
agricultural inputs (like tractors) should be taxed since they are used 
primarily by rich farmers. while other inputs (lite fertilizer) should be 
subsidized since they are used by poor as well as rich farmers. The above 
analysis suggests that such policies. when aimed at cash crops and produc­
tion inputs. can not be justified on the 1rounds of equity alone; the 
primary justification for them should come from the importance of cross 
price effects. ... 
VI. THE SOVIET DEBATE AND COLLECTIVIZATION 
The Soviet industrialization debate (1924-28) is important. despite 
its polemics, because it anticipated some of the difficult. but central. 
trade-offs which confront many of today's developing economies. There was 
an over-emphasis in this debate on a price squeeze of peasants a sourceas 
aof investible surplus, whereas the possible increase in surplus through 
wage squeeze of the proletariat was under-emphasized. This bias, however, 
may not be surprising, given the pro-proletariat bias of the early Soviet 
state. Also, among the issues which received insufficient attention in 
this debate, but which turn out to be central according to our analysis, 
are the incentives of peasants and proletariat, and the general 
equilibrium effects of the terms of trade. 
Our main interest here is to use parts of our analysis to clarify some 
of the propositions advanced by Evgeny Preobrazhensty. Specifically he 
proposed that (i) the state can increase capital accumulation by turning 
the terms of trade against peasants and (ii) this can be done without 
hurting the proletariat. In the context of our model, these cu be re-
phrased as: ( i) dl/ dp < 0 , and (ii) dv2/dp i O, while dI/dp < 0. 
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In our 1984a paper we referred to the above as Preobrazhensky's first and 
second proposition, respectively, and showed that, in a closed economy and 
in the absence of wage-productivity effects, the first proposition is 
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valid, while the second proposition is not. As espressions (15) and 
(14) demonstrate, respectively, the same conclusions hold in an economy 
with external trade, if the traded quantities are constrained. Wage­
productivity effects do not change our conclusion concerning the second 
proposition. Aho, our conclusion concernina the first proposition..
remains unaltered provided wage-productivity effects are not too 
significant. 
If external trade is unconstrained then the society has somewhat 
greater flexibility and, as one would expect, the outcome is somewhat 
different. Specifically, our interpretation of expressions (7) and (18) 
suggests that the above propositions of Preobrazhensky are valid within 
certain ranges of the terms of trade, but not below these ranges. 
Though it is peripheral to our analysis, a question which might be of 
some interest to historians of economic thought is whether an economy with 
2.!, without constraints on external trade is a more appropriate model to 
understand Preobrazhensky's propositions. According to Paul Gregory and 
Robert Stuart (1981, pp. 73-74), Preobrazhensky believed that even though 
the Soviet state would gain to some extent from external trade, their 
ability to trade was constrained by the lack of credits which their 
capitalist enemies might not provide. 
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The Fundamental Law of Primitive Socialist Accumulation: " ••• the 
smaller the inheritance received by the socialist accumulation fund of the 
proletariat,,,when the social revolution takes place, by so much the more, 
in proportion, will socialist accumulation be obliged to rely on 
alienating part of the surplus product of pre-socialist forms of economy 
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and the smaller will be the relative weight of accumulation on its own 
production basis, that is, the less will it be nourished by the surplus 
product of the workers in socialist industry.'' (Preobrazhensky, p. 124) 
Thia 'law' appears to suggest that a lower current capital stock 
(a) necessitates the state to put a greater price squeeze on peasants, and 
(b) implies that the profit from the industrial sector would be a smaller 
fraction of the total inveatible surplus. For brevity, we shall refer to 
the above as Preobrazhensky's third and fourth propositions, respectively. 
Within our model, a smaller current capital stock would imply a larger 
value of the social weight on investment, & • With this interpretation, 
the third proposition is correct in the sense th•t the optimal terms of 
trade would tend to be lower if 6 is higher [see ezpreuion (12), for 
example]. What this proposition does not recognize is that, regardless of 
the capital stock, a price squeeze on peasants beyond some level would be 
counter productive, not because the state likes or dislikes peasants, but 
because doing so would reduce investment and would hurt the proletariat 
(see expression (18)]. 
The fourth proposition may also be correct under certain circum­
stances. For instance, at fixed wages and prices, a lower capital stock 
means that the profit from the industrial sector is lower, and 10 is the 
proportion of the total investible surplus coming from that sector. But a 
lower capital stock affects 6, as well as the industrial wage and the 
terms of trade. As we have argued earlier, the precise changes in p 
and w (and, therefore, the changes in the proportions of investible 
surplus) are in part determined by the value judgments of the society 
concerning the welfare of peasants versus proletariat. 
Collectivization: Our analysis shows that there is a limit to how low 
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the prices to peasants should be pushed, regardless of whether the st~te 
values them or not, and there is a corresponding limit to how large a 
surplus can be extracted from peasants. If a state wants to extract more 
surplus than this, then it must discover some alternative way of organiz­
ing the rural sector. One can interpret the Soviet collectivization as a 
24 response to these problems. According to this interpretation, collec-
tivization was seen as an organizational form which would allow a 
significantly larger surplus extraction from the rural sector; this 
would not only enable a faster accumulation of capital (deemed by early 
Soviet leaders to be urgently needed) but also a betterment of the 
proletariat. As is now well recognized. collectivization did not solve 
the incentive problems which are at the heart of what is at issue. 
Using economic terminology, collectivization can be viewed as a sub­
stitution of a supervisory-command system for a price-incentive system. 
Some aspects of the comparison between the two systems (such as the 
workers' incentives to shirk under the former) have been extensively 
studied. Here, we would like briefly to raise an aspect which has 
received insufficient attention. Most of the literature has focussed on a 
comparison of the ability of alternative organizations to induce workers 
to achieve certain work norms. But a critical problem, particularly in 
agriculture (where there are wide variations in the quality of land from 
plot to plot, and in the climatic conditions from season to season), is 
the setting of norms. 
25 What 'should' be the output from a plot of 
land? Bow much work is 'reasonable' to expect from someone? When 
individuals work on their own plots, they make these decisions for 
themselves. Also, supervisory systems may work better in a competitive 
environment, because workers can choose among a variety of farms, where 
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differences in pay may correspond to differences in work norms. But there 
is virtually no endogenous basis for norm determination in a collective 
26 economy. 
One method of obtaining some of the infonation which is critical to 
the determination of norms for different locations is to have private 
plots in the neighborhood of collectives. Another possible method h to 
set contests among collectives such that high performers receive large 
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rewards whereas low performers receive significant punishments. Both 
of these methods may, however, be inconsistent with certain interpreta­
tions of the socialist ideals. 
VII. EXTENSIONS 
Instruments of Policy: The analysis of pricing policies is critically 
influenced by what is the set of instruments which the government can or 
can not control. This in turn depends on the ability of the fiscal 
bureaucracy, as well as on the informational and administrative costs 
associated with alternative sets of instruments. The analysis of the 
terms of trade on which the present paper -- as well as previous debates 
- have focussed assumes that all individuals (rural as well as urban) 
face the same prices. An important example of an alternative set of 
instruments is when the government can administer two different sets of 
prices in the two sectors. To be able to do so, the government 11111st have 
the ability to monitor ( at reasonable administrative costs) the movement 
of goods across the border between the two sectors. Its main implication 
is that a change in the prices of goods in one sector does not have a 
28direct effect on individuals in the other sector. 
Another set of instruments which are employed in U>Cs entail urban 
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rations and queues for certain goods, particularly for food. The primary 
consequence of such non-price instruments is that an individual's 
effective prices become different from the market prices he faces. In our 
model, for instance, if food rations are binding on homogeneous urban 
individuals, then the effective prices faced by them are different from 
those faced by peasants, even though the market prices are the same 
throughout the economy. The analysis of this case, therefore, is parallel 
to the one discussed above, in which the aoverament can administer two 
sets of prices in the two sectors. Similarly, in a heterogeneous urban 
population facing uniform rations, those individuals whose consumption is 
constrained by rations would face different effective prices, depending on 
1 h . . 29the1r. persona c aracter1st1cs. 
A tax which has often been advocated by economists in the context of 
lDCs is land tax, There are some serious difficulties with this form of 
taxation, however. If the tax is based on land area alone, and not on 
land quality, then it is viewed as unfair, particularly when there are 
significant variations in the quality composition of land holdings of 
different individuals. Since land quality itself is not observable, and 
land markets are imperfect, implementation of a tax based on quality 
requires the use of surrogate variables which can be observed by an 
outside party at a reasonable cost. Variables such as the distance from 
irrigation canals can perform this role to some extent but they may not 
have a high correlation with quality since land improvement is often a 
major source of productivity. Land improvement, on the other hand, is not 
only under individuals' control but also is only partly observable. Other 
variables such as inputs and outputs are also of limited use because it is 
difficult to infer land quality from these variables; moreover, a tax 
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based on these variables is no longer a 'land' tax. 
Features of the Economy: For brevity, our analysis in this paper has 
abstracted from many important features of the economy. A particularly 
important omission concerns the migration of labor between sectors and 
30
unemployment which might be created by such migration. This, however, 
can be easily incorporated into our model. A key consequence of migration 
is that various elasticities are adjusted to reflect the fact that the 
sectoral populations are sensitive to policy changes. For example, the 
~ 
rural surplus elasticity would now represent the increase in the surplus 
of a farmer due to a price increase, as well as the effect on the surplus 
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due to the price-induced migration between the two sectors. 
Another part of the model which we have simplified is the specifica­
tion of the agricultural sector. We have analy&ed an agricultural sector 
consisting of heterogeneous individuals who buy and sell labor services, 
and in which the rural wage is endogenously determined. The main point of 
this model was to show how an induced effect of price change can be 
determined and how this, in turn, can be used to determine the welfare 
consequences on different individuals in the rural sector. It should be 
clear, however, that the wage effect is only one of the numerous induced 
effects, and that the specific model one should construct to study the 
relevant effects should reflect the institutional features of the economy 
under consideration. For example, while family farming may predominate in 
some countries, sharecropping or parastatal based agriculture may be more 
typical in others, Furthermore, credit arrangements, and the intra­
household arrangements for sharing work and consumption may differ widely 
across societies. For an analysis of the effects of changes in the terms 
of trade, the central step in each case is to determine the induced effect 
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of price change (for example on the terms of sharecropping, on the ter
ms 
of credit, etc. ) • _ 
VIII. CONCLUDING IFJIABS 
A question of vital importance to aoat U>Ca is how beat to raise the 
fiu1d1 required to finance a rapid accumlation of capital. In adclltion,
 
LDC goverDJDents face a constraint that very few instnaents of policy
 are 
available to them; 90t only their fiscal authorities have limited 
abilities, but also sophisticated in1tr11111ent1 of policy are infeasible
 
because of their informational and adainiatrative coats. It h not 
surprising, therefore, that the terms of trade between aariculture and
 
industry has been viewed as a primary instrument for raising the inve
st­
ible surplus in economies at early stasea of their developaent. The 
issue 
of the appropriate terms of trade was central in the Soviet industria
liza­
tion debate (we interpret some aspects of this debate using our analy
sis). 
More recently, the terms of trade has been a source of controversy in
 non­
socialist as well as socialist U>Cs. 
In this paper, we have presented a seneral equilibrium aodel, within 
which we identify the consequences of chansing the terms of trade (on
 
those in the rural sector, on those in the urban sector, and on the 
investible surplus) as well as the qualitative properties of the optim
al 
terms of trade. We show that the conclusions (positive as well as 
normative) concerning the terms of trade depend in an important way o
n the 
salient features of the economy; among the features of the economy wh
ich 
we have emphasized in this paper are the external trade environment f
aced 
by the country, the mechanism for the determination of industrial wag
es 
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and earnings, and the effects of changes in prices and wages
 on the 
productivity of workers. 
We have obtained a number of results delineating conditions 
under 
which the agricultural sector would be taxed (or subsidized)
. Also. we 
have delineated ~onditions which predict who within the rura
l sector 
(landless workers or landlords. for example) will gain or lo
se from a 
change in the terms of trade. In addition. we have proposed
 powerful 
rules for reform in the prices of cash crops and production 
inputs: 
these rules are not only parsimonious in the information req
uired to use 
them, but also they are Pareto improving: it is desirable to
 use them 
regardless of what the social welfare function might be. 
U>Cs differ widely in what are the salient features of the e
conomy 
and, therefore, it is not f~asible to incorporate every pote
ntially 
We have. however, indicated howimportant feature in a single analysis. 
our model can be extended in a number of directions. Also, 
we have. not 
pursued here some of the important uses to which an analysis
 such as the 
present one can be put. For instance, governments often ju
stify the 
particular policies which they pursue. with equalitarian rhe
toric. It is 
important, then, to examine whether significant redistributi
on from the 
rich to the poor is possible through the set of policy instr
uments which a 
government is constrained to employ (or which it chooses to 
employ).
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Our model can also be used (with reasonable values of param
eters 
representing the economy) to identify the circumstances unde
r which the 
existing policies in a country can possibly be consistent w
ith an 
We conjecture that at least in manyequalitarian social welfare function. 
cases (particularly in those widely prevalent cases in which
 the 
government 'appears' to subsidize everyone) important incon
sistencies 
3S 
will be detected. Whether identifying such inconsistencies is more likely 
to affect the policy, or the rhetoric, is a moot question. 
APPENDIX I 
Denote the unit profit function as G • G(G
1(p1 , w1 ), G
2(p
2)) 
• pz - w1L
d , where p
2 is the vector of production good•~ prices. Then, 
wherefor the production good j , 




• aG1aG2 aw1 
1 
aG2 • 
is the same for all j • 
The labor market clearing condition is w
1 ) • 0 , which, 
h 
upon differentiation, gives dw
1/dpj • -<2 ,lhaL1h/ipj)/ l ,lhaL1h/aw1 • 
h h 
Next, the prices of production good affect the labor supply only through 
the full income: Mh c w
1Lh + AhG, where Lh is the endowment of labor. 
Thus aL1h/ip. • Ahz.iLsh/aMh - AhaLd/ip .• Now, recall that
J J J 
-iL
d
/ipj • glzj • It follows that: dw
1
/dpj where 
I• -2 ,lhAh(gl + iLsh/BMh)/2 NlhaLlh/awl • 
h h 
Using the last expression and the symmetry property 
izi/ipj • Bzj/Bpi, the derivative of (6) can be expressed as (29), where 
B • -1 + (p - P)~ ,lh[Ah axlh - 1 aqh]/A and x
1h is the consUJDption 
; iMh iwl 




•Department of Economics, Economic Growth Center and School of Organ
iza­
tion and Management, Yale University; and Department of Economics, 
Princeton University, respectively. We thank Leon Podkaminer, Micha
el 
Montias, and Gordon Tullock for their useful suggestions. Support fr
om 
the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledaed. 
Note, in particular,1. Other instruments of policy are discussed later. 
that the long-standing debates on price scissors (as well as the 
present analysis) are based on the assumption that the government can
 
This assump­not set two different sets of prices in the two sectors. 
tion may not be appropriate for some U>Cs, like India and South 
Korea; later, we discuss the corresponding formulations. 
For example, due to the effect of wages on workers' efficiency,2. 
quality and turnover. See Stiglitz (1982), Yellen (1984), and the 
references therein. 
3. In India, for instance, Ashok Mitra (1977) has argued that highe
r 
agricultural prices have a deleterious effect on distribution, where
as 
A. S. Kalhon and D.S. Tyagi (1980) have argued that the opposite is 
the case. 
4. The superscripts 1 and 2 denote the agricultural and industrial 
sectors. 
S. This formulation can be easily extended to include household produc­
tion goods or so-called 'Z-goods,' which peasants produce and consume
 
but do not trade, presumably because of high transactions costs. 
Fl 
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Though the precise consequences of such goods would depend on the 
substitution possibilities in production and consumption, it is plaus-
1
ible that the surplus elasticity, IQp • will be smaller in the 
presence of such goods than without them. 
6. The analysis corresponding to variable labor hours of workers in the 
urban sector can be easily worked out. 
•-
7. For example, if productivity is increasing in the consumption quanti­
ties of various goods, then a change in the price of one good 
increases the consumption of some goods (gross substitutes) and 
reduces the consumption of other goods (gross complements). The over­
all effect of a price change on productivity, therefore, can not be 
predicted without additional restrictions. 
8. To avoid trivial details, we assume that there are some substitution 
2u
possibilities in consumption; that is, I xp ) 0 • 
9. W is concave and increasing in V If the social welfare function 
is not anonymous between rural and urban individuals, then W will be 
superscripted by i = 1 and 2, respectively. 
10. In fact, this result holds even if wage-productivity effects are sig-
nificant, provided (J = (Jm p 
11. The reason why these conclusions are partial is this. Note that 
equations (11) and (12) implicitly characterize the optimal (p, w) , 
but they do not provide a closed-form solution (because (p, w) 
appear on both sides of these equations). A full comparative statics 
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analysis based on these equations is difficult because
 the effects of 
(p, w) on variables such as elasticities can not be p
redicted in 
general. Partial insights, however, can be obtained b
y treating 
~•s, a',, e's. a and e as fixed parameters in the 
neighborhood of an optimum, and by changing one paramete
r at a time. 
The resulting insights are clearly useful, but they 11111s
t also be 
treated with some caution. 
it is clear froJ11 (15) that, if12. Also, recalling.the definition of p , 
a ( 1 • then the absolute value of
 the right hand side of (15) is 
m 
1 That is, the response of the inveatiblelarger if is larger.£Qp 
surplus to a change in the terms of trade is larger if p
easants' 
This should not be surprising since, insurplus elasticity is larger. 
the present case, a reduction in the terms of trade ne
cessitates a 
larger decrease in urban wage. Parallel conclusion do
es not always 
hold, however, when external trade is unconstrained. 
For instance, if 
(7) is positive, then whether its absolute value incre
ases or de-
creases with depends on whether peasants are being
 taxed or 
subsidized, 
13. Thus, the optimal terms of trade and the shadow pric
es (for social 
cost-benefit analysis) are determined simultaneously. 
14. Our 1984a paper emphasized this case, and it abstrac
ted from wage­
productivity effects. 
15. If the constraints on external trade are binding t
hen, with completely 
endogenous wage, the terms of trade can not be altered
 without intro­
ducing additional policy instruments. 
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16. It is obvious from the expression (18) for p* • that p• < P. 
17. To verify this, note from (17) that the change in the urban wage 
corresponding to a change in price is: dw/dp c x 
2/L2 Using this, 
and (6). calculate The result follows. 
18. Furthe.r. suppose we define a 'self-sufficient' farmer to be the one 
1 
who neither buys nor sells labor services. that is. L h • 0, then 
it is apparent from (20) and (21) that this farmer is better-off if 
the terms of trade are higher. Categories such as self-sufficient 
farmers and marginal farmers (those who are not landless but are 
sufficiently poor) have often been used in policy discussions, 
particularly in India. It should be clear that the boundary lines of 
such categories, whether defined on the basis of net trade of labor or 
goods, or the basis of given level of welfare (real income), areon a 
themselves dependent on the wages and prices. 
19. As should be obvious, this result holds even if the wage rate does not 
equal marginal product, so long as the labor demand depends only on 
w 1/p. that is, it is homogeneous of degree zero in the wage rate 
and the price. 
20. The induced wage effects emphasized in this model are typically absent 
in the standard iax models [see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), for a 
review] which assume that the general equilibrium effects are 
insignificant, or that the government can control wages. Either 
as.sumption is unsatisfactory in the context of the agricultural sector 
of an ll>C. 
FS 
21. This happens if the unit (land) profit function is 
separable beh·een 
the prices of production goods and other prices; see Ap
pendix I. 
For details on the underlying production technologies, 
see Lau (1978). 
22. Michael Ellman'• important empirical studies, s11J1111
1arized in his 1979 
He assesses the contributionsbook, are suggestive in this context. 
of peasants and proletariat to the Soviet accumulation 
during the 
First Plan period, and demonstrates that the proletaria
t suffered a 
loss during this period. (Ellman'• _analysis, however, r
efers to the 
post-collectivization period when the policy instrument
 was coercion 
rather than the terms of trade.) Also note here that, 
besides the 
terms of trade, Preobrazhensy discussed many other instru
ments of 
_policy, such as: railroad tariffs, printing money, cre
dit policy, 
etc. The centerpiece of his verbal analysis, as well a
s that of his 
critics, is the terms of trade, on which we have focuss
ed in this 
paper. 
23. A different question is, which one of the above mo
dels is a better 
representation of the Soviet economy before the debate,
 that is, 
The trade volume during this period shows an extremeduring 1918-24. 
decline compared to the pre-World War I period [see Mic
hael Kaser 
(1969)]. This evidence, however, does not provide an a
nswer because 
any level of trade is consistent with both models; as w
e have 
emphasized, what is relevant is whether the economy can
 increase its 
trade at the margin. 
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24. This, of course, is a purely 'economic' interp
retation. At the other 
extreme, one can argue that the reasons for collec
tivization were 
entirely 'non~economic,' such as the comiitment of
 the Soviet state to 
destroy the power of potentially reactionary peasant
ry, or to simply 
abolish private property. 
25. The problem of norm setting also arises in indu
strial production, 
particularly in connection with setting appropriat
e piece rates in the 
presence of changes in teclmoloay. 
26. This analysis also suggests that productivity 
on collectives may 
decline over time (relative to the contemporaneous
 performance of 
In early days of a collective, historicalprice-incentive systems}. 
productivity may provide a reasonable basis for no
rm determination: 
as technology changes, it provides a less and less
 adequate basis. 
Moreover, in early days, there may be a cadre of i
ndividuals committed 
to making the collectives work; these individuals 
may not need much 
economic incentive: as time progresses, the necess
ity of economic 
incentives may increase. 
27. See Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), and Lazear and
 Rosen (1981) for 
analyses of contests. 
28. See Sah and Stiglitz (1984a) for the correspon
ding analysis. 
29. See Sah (1982)~ 
30. Endogenous migration can be significant not on
ly in lDCs but also in 
socialist economies, as has been pointed out by El
lman (1979, p. 94). 
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31. For a detailed analysis, see Sah and Stiglitz (1984a, 19
84b, 1985). 
32. See Sah (1983). 
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